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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY- TAXATION- RESIDENCE OF
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF IS
IMMUNE FROM TAXATION UNDER A BILATERAL AGREEMENT
AND THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
In 1976, the German Democratic Republic [hereinafter East
Germany]' purchased an apartment building in Arlington County,
Virginia [hereinafter County].' The building was used exclusively
to house the East German diplomatic and consular staffs and their
families.' In 1978, the County sued East Germany in federal district
court for real estate taxes allegedly due on the property for 1977
and for the declaration of a tax lien." The court entered judgment
for the County.' East Germany protested to the State Department
of the United States, arguing that it was immune from jurisdic-
tion and that the suit violated international law.' The first response
of the State Department was to arrange an agreement between
the United States and East Germany specifying that neither
government would tax property owned by the other government
if that property was used exclusively for the purposes of diplomatic
missions.7 The agreement was signed on May 4, 1979.8 Nevertheless,
the County continued to tax the property.' At the request of the
State Department, the United States then sued the County."0 The
district court held that the County could not assess taxes after
the date of the agreement but that the property was subject to
' This method of reference avoids confusion with the Federal Republic of Germany, often
referred to as West Germany or, simply, Germany.
United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 927 (4th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 933-34. The court noted that the record did not show the use of the property
prior to May 4, 1979. Id. at 933.
' Id. at 927. See County Bd. v. E. Ger., No. 78-293-A (E.D. Va. Sept. 6, 1978) (order), reprinted
in 17 I.L.M. 1404 (1978); County Bd. v. E. Ger., No. 78-293-A (E.D. Va. Sept. 7, 1978) (order),
reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1402 (1978).
5 United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 928 (4th Cir. 1982); County Bd.
v. E. Ger., No. 78-293-A (E.D. Va. Sept. 7, 1978) (order), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1402, 1403 (1978).
' United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 928 (4th Cir. 1982).
' Id. The court interpreted the agreement as ancillary to the recognition of East Ger-
many by the President in 1974. Id. at 930. See Agreed Minute on Negotiations Concerning
the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, Sept. 4, 1974, United States-East Germany,
25 U.S.T. 2597, T.I.A.S. No. 7937.
United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 928 (4th Cir. 1982).
Id.
" Id. The United States filed its action in the same federal district court seeking 1) a
declaratory judgment that the property was exempt from the County taxation, 2) that all
assessments and liens be voided, and 3) an injunction prohibiting further attempts to col-
lect taxes. Id.
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taxation prior to the agreement." On appeal to the Fourth Cir-
cuit: held, affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed that the property was exempt from
taxes after the agreement,12 but reversed and remanded concern-
ing the period before the agreement." The agreement with East
Germany was held to be a valid exercise of executive power because
it related to the recognition of a foreign state, and to take
precedence over the County's denial of immunity under the Virginia
Constitution.1 However, prior to the agreement, the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 197615 had granted immunity to East
Germany as a foreign sovereign from the execution of any judg-
ment for taxes on property used exclusively by diplomatic and con-
sular staffs and their families. United States v. County of Arlington,
669 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1982).
In previous cases 6 concerning taxation of the residences of am-
bassadors, United Nations representatives, Consul-Generals and
their staffs and families, two distinct approaches have evolved.
In the absence of a treaty, the doctrine of sovereign immunity fre-
quently has been applied. 17 When a treaty does exist, it takes
precedence over local tax laws. 8
11 Id.
12 Id. at 927, 936.
11 Id. The decision on remand likely will turn on whether the use of the property fits
the exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. Id. at 936. Remand
was considered necessary because the record did not specify the use of the property prior
to May 4, 1979. Id. However, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that the United States would
not be barred from raising other issues before the district court. Id.
14 Id. at 932.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. SS 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1976)).
"6 United States v. City of Glen Cove, 322 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (mem.), affd per
curiam, 450 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1971) (treaty: residence of U.N. representatives from U.S.S.R.);
Argen. v. City of N.Y., 25 N.Y.2d 252, 250 N.E.2d 698 (1969) (no treaty: consular offices);
Fin. v. Town of Pelham, 26 A.D.2d 35, 270 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966) (treaty: residence
of Consul-General); In re City of New Rochelle v. Ghana, 44 Misc. 2d 773, 255 N.Y.S.2d
178 (Westchester County Ct. 1964) (no treaty: residences of U.N. representatives from Ghana,
Indonesia and Liberia); Knocklong Corp. v. Afghanistan, 6 Misc. 2d 700, 167 N.Y.S.2d 285
(Nassau County Ct. 1957) (no treaty: residence of U.N. representative).
" See Argen. v. City of N.Y., 25 N.Y.2d 252, 250 N.E.2d 698 (1969); In re City of New
Rochelle v. Ghana, 44 Misc. 2d 773, 255 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Westchester County Ct. 1964);
Knocklong Corp. v. Afghanistan, 6 Misc. 2d 700, 167 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Nassau County Ct. 1957).
Reference re Power of Municipalities to Levy Rates on Foreign Legations and High Com-
missioners' Residences, [1943] 2 D.L.R. 481 (Can. 1943); Yin-Tso Hsiung v. Toronto, [1950]
4 D.L.R. 209 (Ont. High Ct. 1950).
" United States v. City of Glen Cove, 322 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (mem.), aff'd per
curiam, 450 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1971); Fin. v. Town of Pelham, 26 A.D.2d 35, 270 N.Y.S.2d
661 (1966).
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Few cases involving treaties have been litigated. In a case
brought in the New York state courts by Finland, the property
in question was the residence of the Consul-General.19 The court
found that the residential use met the standard of exclusive govern-
mental use specified in the treaty with Finland.' The court observed
that the practice of providing a residence for certain officials is
a governmental function in the area of foreign, diplomatic, and con-
sular relations,2 and that the United States even has provided
residences for its governmental officials within its own borders."
Thus, the question for the court was whether the treaty covered
the specific situation in the case before it. Similarly, in a case23
brought by the United States24 against a New York municipality
in federal district court, it was held that a bilateral treaty between
the United States and the U.S.S.R. prevented the taxation of the
residence provided by the U.S.S.R. for its United Nations
representatives. 25 The United States has entered into numerous
bilateral treaties exempting consular and embassy property from
taxation,' and is also a party to both the Vienna Convention on
'9 Fin. v. Town of Pelham, 26 A.D.2d 35, 270 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1966).
20 Id. at 36, 38, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 661, 664. The treaty involved was the Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce, and Consular Rights, Feb. 13, 1934, United States-Finland, 49 Stat. 2659,
T.S. No. 868. It provides, in pertinent part: "Lands and buildings situated in the territory
of either High Contracting Party, of which the other High Contracting Party is the legal
or equitable owner and which are used exclusively for governmental purposes by that owner,
shall be exempt from taxation of every kind, National, State, Provincial and Muncipal, other
than assessments levied for services or local public improvements by which the premises
are benefited." (emphasis added). Treaty of Friendship. Commerce, and Consular Rights,
art. 21, para. 3, 49 Stat. at 2675.
" Fin. v. Town of Pelham, 26 A.D. at 37, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
' Id. One of the examples given is the provision of the White House for the President
of the United States. Id.
23 United States v. City of Glen Cove, 322 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (mem.), affd per
curiam, 450 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1971)..
24 The right of the United States to bring the action was contested. Id. at 152. The court
expressed its concern that the "conduct of foreign relations would be hampered and em-
barrassed if the United States Government were powerless to require units of local govern-
ment to comply with treaty obligations, and if a treaty could be enforced only by the foreign
government making itself a party." Id.
"5 Id. at 152. The treaty involved was the Consular Convention, July 13, 1968, United
States-U.S.S.R., 14 U.S.T. 5108, T.I.A.S. No. 6503. It provides, in pertinent part: "Immovable
property . . . used for diplomatic or consular purposes, including residences for personnel
attached to the diplomatic and consular establishments, shall be exempt from taxation of
any kind imposed by the receiving state or any of its states or local governments other
than such as represent payments for specific services rendered." Consular Convention,
art. 21. In dictum, the court noted that it also could have considered the Agreement between
the United Nations and the United States Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations,
June 26, 1947, United Nations-United States, 61 Stat. 3416, T.I.A.S. No. 1676.
A partial list of these treaties appears in Bishop, Immunity from Taxation of Foreign
State-Owned Property, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 252 (1952).
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Diplomatic Relations" and the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations.28 When a treaty exists, the court need only consider
whether the terms of the treaty exempt the property from taxation.
Courts also have disallowed taxation in the absence of specific
treaties.' However, they sometimes have done so only with ex-
pressed reluctance.' The theoretical approaches used in these cases
have not been entirely consistent. Three general approaches can
be discerned in United States and, for elaboration, Canadian deci-
sions: 1) sovereign immunity from jurisdiction;3' 2) sovereign im-
munity from execution;" and 3) immunity from taxation as a
sovereign right.3 The first approach obviously would not apply
when the foreign sovereign brings the suit," consents to be sued, 5
or is sued by the United States. 6
Under the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, any immu-
nity from jurisdiction is recognized only for the noncommercial
acts of a sovereign. 7 This approach was endorsed by the United
" Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
" Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No.
6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
" See supra note 17 for specific cases. In addition to cases tried in the courts, numerous
opinions have been issued by State Attorneys General concerning taxation of property
of foreign sovereigns. See Bishop, supra note 26, at 242, 244-50.
, In re City of New Rochelle v. Ghana, 44 Misc. 2d 773, 775 255 N.Y.S.2d 178, 180
(Westchester County Ct. 1964).
s" If a sovereign is immune from jurisdiction, no judgment for taxes due or for liens
against the property taxed may be obtained as the court will not have jurisdiction to hear
the case.
If a sovereign is immune from execution, any tax due may not be collected pursuant
to court order. The tax theoretically could be paid voluntarily if it had been assessed or
if a judgment for the amount due had been entered.
3 Under this view, a sovereign is immune from taxation based directly upon its sovereignty
as to and equal status with other sovereigns.
I See, e.g., Argen. v. City of N.Y., 25 N.Y. 2d 252, 250 N.E.2d 698 (1969); Fin. v. Town
of Pelham, 26 A.D. 35, 270 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966); Yin-Tso Hsiung v. Toronto,
[1950] 4 D.L.R. 209 (Ont. High Ct. 1950). In these cases, sovereign immunity from jurisdic-
tion is not at issue because the sovereign has initiated the court action. In one case, the
foreign sovereign was suing to recover taxes it had paid for 18 years. Argen. v. City of
N.Y., 25 N.Y.2d at 257, 250 N.E.2d at 699.
See, e.g., County Bd. v. E. Ger., No. 78-293-A (E.D. Va. Sept. 6, 1978), reprinted in 17
I.L.M. 1404 (1978) (motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction denied); Knocklong Corp. v.
Afghanistan, 6 Misc. 2d 700, 167 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Nassau County Ct. 1957) (motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction granted). In these cases, the foreign sovereign appeared in court
to contest the court's jurisdiction.
" See, e.g., United States v. City of Glen Cove, 322 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (mem.),
affd per curium, 450 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1971).
" Under the earlier theory of absolute sovereign immunity, a sovereign could not be
sued for any act. See generally Ross, Sovereign Immunity and Judicial Remedies against
the Government in the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium and West Germany, 10 INT'L LAW 439
432
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States State Department in the "Tate letter."' The letter particular-
ly noted that diplomatic and "perhaps" consular property always
had been and would continue to be immune from jurisdiction. 9
The letter also recognized that the courts would ascertain the am-
bit of their jurisdiction." In a subsequent case" involving the
residences of the United Nations representatives 42 from Ghana, In-
donesia, and Liberia, a New York state court reluctantly refused
to exercise jurisdiction because to do so would "embarrass the ex-
ecutive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs."" The restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity has been codified recently in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976." While in general a sovereign
always has been 45 and remains immune from jurisdiction in litiga-
tion concerning its noncommercial acts,"' jurisdiction may be based
upon immovable property within the United States.47 It was the
intent of Congress that diplomatic or consular property would be
excluded from such immovable property.8
(1976), and other articles in that volume. The history of sovereign immunity in the United
States is reviewed in the articles cited concerning the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976. See infra note 44.
Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to Phillip
B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEPT ST. BULL. 984
(1952).
" Id. The letter elaborated that such property was considered immune under both the
absolute and restrictive theories of sovereign immunity as well as in practice. Id.
,o Id. at 985.
, In re City of New Rochelle v. Ghana, 44 Misc. 2d 773, 255 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Westchester
County Ct. 1964).
' United Nations representatives are considered diplomatic rather than consular officers.
Arcaya v. Paez, 145 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), affd per curiam, 244 F.2d 958 (2d Cir.
1957). Concerning the individual privileges and immunities of United Nations represen-
tatives, see generally Gross, Immunities and Privileges of Delegations to the United Nations,
16 INT'L ORG. 483 (1962); Ling, A Comparative Study of the Privileges and Immunities of United
Nations Member Representatives and Officials with the Traditional Privileges and Immunities
of Diplomatic Agents, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91 (1976). Although the immunities of state
officials are distinct from the immunities of the sovereign they represent, the purpose of
granting immunities to the individuals is to aid the diplomatic relations between the
sovereigns. See United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 930 (4th Cir. 1982).
In re City of New Rochelle v. Ghana, 44 Misc.2d at 775, 55 N.Y.S.2d at 180 (Westchester
County Ct. 1964).
" See supra note 15. See generally Carl, Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts:
The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L.J. 1009 (1979);
Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 50 FORDHAM
L. REV. 155 (1981); Note, Sovereign Immunity-Limits of Judicial Control-The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429 (1977).
See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. S 1604 (1976).
Id. at S 1605(a(4).
, See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6604, 6618-19.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The second possible theory exempting diplomatic and consular
property from taxation in the absence of an applicable treaty is
that of sovereign immunity from execution. Concerning taxation,
courts have blended the concepts of immunity from jurisdiction
and from execution into a concept of uncollectability. In an early
case 49 involving the personal property of a sovereign within its
borders, the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that because the
sovereign could not be sued for the tax, the only avenues for col-
lection would be either to ask the State Department to open inter-
national negotiations or to ask Congress to declare war.' The court
determined that the tax should not be assessed as the state of
"helplessness" created would be at variance with the sovereign
right of taxation." In a recent case, a New York court stated the
problem of uncollectability as follows: "The unenforceability of a
claim for taxes stems from the fact that no sovereign state can
itself be sued without its consent, and its governmental property
is not susceptible to attachment, levy or seizure by the courts or
other authorities of a foreign country." 2 However, the court noted
that a government nevertheless may assess the tax and simply
"hope that it might be paid voluntarily." 3
In fact, the Canadian government regularly paid taxes assessed
by local governments on the property of foreign sovereigns. This
practice changed after the Canadian Supreme Court issued an ad-
visory opinion on the power of municipalities to tax Foreign Lega-
tions and High Commissioners' Residences [hereinafter Foreign
Legations case].' The Foreign Legations case was found particularly
persuasive by the New York court in Argentina v. City of New
York. 6 In the Foreign Legations case, one Justice stated that the
municipality should not assess and levy the taxes because they
" Fr. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 200 Ky. 18, 252 S.W. 124 (1923).
' Id. at 21, 252 S.W. at 125.
" Id., 252 S.W. at 125.
52 Argen. v. City of N.Y., 25 N.Y.2d 252, 261, 250 N.E.2d 698, 701 (1969). In this case,
Argentina sued a New York municipality that had taxed a building once used by the govern-
mental agencies of Argentina and later occupied by the Argentine Counsul-General. Argen-
tina sought a refund for past taxes paid, a judgment declaring the property exempt from
taxes, and the removal of the tax liens on the property. Id. at 257, 250 N.E.2d at 699.
Id. at 262-63, 250 N.E.2d at 702.
' Reference re Power of Municipalities to Levy Rates on Foreign Legations and High
Commissioners' Residences, [1943] 2 D.L.R. 481-83 (Can. 1943).
" Foreign Legations case, [1943] 2 D.L.R. 481 (Can. 1943). The Canadian Supreme Court
issued this advisory opinion in response to questions presented by the Governor-General.
Id. at 482. The Chief Justice ruled that the property was not taxable under principles of
international law concerning absolute sovereign independence. Id. at 500-02.
" See infra note 67 and the text to which it pertains.
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would be uncollectable under principles of sovereign immunity from
jurisdiction. Another Justice would have allowed assessment in
view of the possibility that the foreign state would pay as a mat-
ter of courtesy or that the Canadian government would continue
to pay.'
In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
197619 sets forth an exception to the immunity from attachment
or execution of property used "for purposes of maintaining a
diplomatic or consular mission or the residence of the Chief of such
mission.... ."' By focusing on immunity from execution, a court
may allow the preliminary steps of assessing taxes and possibly
obtaining a judgment of a tax lien in the hope that the foreign
sovereign will pay voluntarily.
The third approach in non-treaty cases provides directly that
a foreign sovereign is immune from taxation of its property within
the borders of another sovereign." Reasons for such immunity in-
clude the concerns that the imposition of taxes upon a foreign
sovereign could be viewed "as an affront to its sovereignty, an
interference with its independence, or a denial of its equality with
the taxing state."6 This approach may be characterized as emerg-
ing substantive international law. In the Foreign Legations case,"
the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the precise question of
whether a municipality may tax property that is both owned and
occupied by a foreign state or its diplomatic agents and used for
the public diplomatic purpose.' The court found such taxation im-
permissible, stating that, "there is a general acceptance of the view
Foreign Legations case, supra note 55, at 503-04 (opinion of Rinfret, J.).
Id. at 508 (opinion of Kerwin, J.).
9 See supra note 15.
Id. at S 1610(a)(4)(B). The provision provides in full that:
The property in the United States of a foreign state used for a commercial activity
in the United States shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution,
or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or
of a State . . . if- . . . the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights
in property- . . . which is immovable and situated in the United States: Provided,
That such property is not used for purposes of maintaining a diplomatic or con-
sular mission or the residence of the Chief of such mission.
Id.
61 Bishop, supra note 26, at 255. This author expressed the concept as follows: "On principle,
tax exemption appears to be a logical accompaniment of the principle of immunity of foreign
state-owned property from judicial process." This concept is reiterated in Tillinghast,
Sovereign Immunity from the Tax Collector: United States Income Taxation of Foreign Govern-
ments and International Organizations, 10 LAW & POL'Y INTL Bus. 495, 527 (1976).
62 Bishop, supra note 26, at 256.
Foreign Legations case, supra note 55.
', Id. at 492-93.
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that such tribute is not exigible, consistently with the principles
of the law of nations." 5 This approach views taxation as the exer-
cise of superior political authority."
The Foreign Legations case strongly influenced the decision in
the only United States case decided squarely under the principles
of customary international law: Argentina v. City of New York. 7
In holding consular property owned by a foreign government
exempt from local real estate taxation under principles of customary
international law,68 the court formulated the test of immunity as
whether the property is used for a public or governmental purpose. 9
As the United States had not yet ratified the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations," the case was not decided under that treaty.
The court, however, did base its finding of the principles of
customary international law largely upon that document.71 Instead
of considering it a binding treaty, the court viewed the document
as the consensus of experts on international law." Additionally,
the court relied upon the concerns of the State Department as ex-
pressed in the "Kearney letter":" "[tjaxation by political subdivi-
sions of the United States of foreign government-owned real prop-
erty used for official purposes has been a growing irritant in the
conduct of the foreign relations of the United States."'74 The govern-
ment also pointed to the practice of other countries of granting
exemptions even without prior treaties or agreements." To the
" Id. at 492.
" Id.
" Argen. v. City of N.Y., 25 N.Y.2d 252, 262-63, 265, 250 N.E.2d 698, 703-04 (1969). The
case is discussed in Comment, Consular Immunity-Taxation of Property-Consular Property
of the Republic of Argentina Held Immune from New York City Real Property Taxes Under
Customary International Law, 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 150 (1970); Comment, International
Law-Taxation of Consular Property-Property Owned by a Foreign State and Exclusively
Used for Consular Purposes Exempt from Municipal Real Estate Taxation, 34 ALB. L. REV.
737 (1970).
Argen. v. City of N.Y., 25 N.Y.2d at 265, 250 N.E.2d at 704.
69 Id.
70 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 28.
7 Argen. v. City of N.Y., 25 N.Y.2d at 259-60, 250 N.E.2d at 701.
" Id. The use of "the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations" was identified as a source of international law in the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(d), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 1976 U.N.Y.B. 1052.
" Argen. v. City of N.Y., 25 N.Y.2d at 258-59, 250 N.E.2d at 700. The letter was written
by Richard D. Kearney, then Acting Legal Advisor to the State Department, to the Comp-
troller of the City of New York. Id. at 258, 250 N.E.2d at 700.
Id. at 259, 250 N.E.2d at 700.
Id. at 260, 250 N.E.2d at 701. The large majority of countries in which the United
States maintains consulates follows this practice. Id.
436 [Vol. 12:429
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extent the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Rela-
tions are now in effect, the approach of immunity from taxation
as an aspect of sovereignty under customary international law has
merged effectively with the analysis under existing treaties.
The first two approaches, immunity from jurisdiction and im-
munity from execution, now are governed by the relevant provi-
sions in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.76 However,
under international law, principles of customary international law
and any applicable treaties would take precedence over the' Act
should a conflict arise concerning the taxation of a foreign
sovereign."
In United States v. County of Arlington, the Fourth Circuit
relied both on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and a bilateral
treaty with East Germany. When the County sued East Germany
for real estate taxes it alleged were due on the East German-owned
apartment building, the United States did not intervene in the ac-
tion because the State Department did not consider the property
exempt from taxation.78 After judgment was entered for the County
and East Germany protested to the State Department, the State
Department belatedly concluded that the property was not taxable. 9
No reason for the vacillation was given. However, the State Depart-
ment's original position was clearly inconsistent with the Tate and
Kearney letters.8
The State Department apparently was concerned about the status
of the law sufficiently that it proceeded to initiate an agreement
between the two countries. 1 Neither the lower court nor the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals found it difficult to recognize the valid-
" Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. SS 1604, 1609 (1976).
" While international law requires that international law take precedence over national
law, the United States considers treaties and federal statutes to be equivalent. Precedence
is determined by time of enactment. "When . . . a constitutional agency adopts a policy
contrary to a trend in international law or to a treaty or prior statute, the courts must
accept the latest act of that agency." Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 668 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1959).
78 United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d at 927.
Id. at 928.
The Tate letter stated that diplomatic and perhaps consular property was to be ex-
cepted from the general nonexistence of immunity for actions relating to real property.
26 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 934, 984 (1952). The Kearney letter, which is cited in the case of Argen-
tina v. City of New York, stated bluntly that, "under recognized principles of international
law and comity the several states of the United States, as well as their political subdivi-
sions, should not assess taxes against foreign government-owned property used for public
noncommercial purposes." Argen. v. City of N.Y., 25 N.Y.2d at 258, 250 N.E.2d at 700.
'" See United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d at 928.
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ity of the agreement;" although, the Fourth Circuit buttressed its
holding with its conception of the agreement as an extension of
the earlier recognition of East Germany by the President.' The
major controversy concerning the validity of the agreement was
whether the executive branch had the authority to make the
agreement.' The County argued that no officer of the United States
was authorized to enter into this agreement. 5 The Fouth Circuit
found that the President had the power to recognize the govern-
ment of a foreign state," and that the scope of the power included
ancillary agreements concerning diplomatic relations. 7 The agree-
ment was held to be a proper extension of the recognition of East
Germany. 8 The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 authorized the
President to specify immunities for diplomats and their families. 9
The Fourth Circuit extended that authorization to provide immunity
from taxation for the foreign governments.0 Except to the extent
that the agreement lacks the status of a treaty, the court's holding
that the apartment building was exempt from taxation under the
bilateral agreement9 ' was entirely consistent with previous
8 Id. at 927, 929.
Id. at 930. The pertinent part of the earlier agreement specified that: "The two govern-
ments will, in supplementation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and on
the basis of reciprocity, accord full diplomatic privileges and immunities to those members
of the administrative and technical staffs and their families... * Agreed Minute on Negotia-
tions Concerning the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 2.
8, United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d at 929-31.
Id. at 929.
88 Id.
87 Id. at 929-30.
8 Id. at 930.
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. S 254(c) (Supp. III 1979). The act provides,
in pertinent part that, "Ithe President may ... specify privileges and immunities for members
of [a mission and their families]... which result in more favorable treatment or less favorable
treatment than is provided under the Vienna Convention." Id.
The pertinent provisions in the Vienna Convention are that a "diplomatic agent shall
be exempt from all dues and taxes, personal or real, national, regional or municipal, except
... (b) dues and taxes on private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving
State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission."
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 27, art. 34.
" See supra note 7. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the President's power, granted
in the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, supra note 89, to alter the immunity from taxation
of a foreign state's diplomats, and therefore indirectly of the state itself, conferred authority
on the President to sign the agreement with East Germany. United States v. County of
Arlington, 669 F.2d at 930. The court also relied upon United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
" See United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d at 929.
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decisions.9" It went beyond those decisions in allowing the Presi-
dent, through his delegate the Secretary of State, to sign a note
providing for reciprocal immunity from taxation.93
In the second part of the opinion, the Fourth Circuit addressed
the question of sovereign immunity from taxation prior to the sign-
ing of the agreement.94 The analysis was based not upon interna-
tional law, but upon the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. 91
The district court had held that the County could enforce a tax lien
to collect the taxes found to be owed prior to May 4, 1979.96 On
appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the County presented two principal
arguments. First, the County noted that the language of section
1610 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides immunity
from execution only for the residence of the Chief of a diplomatic
or consular mission." The building in question was used to house
"the members of the diplomatic, administrative, technical, and ser-
vice staff of the . . . Embassy and their families."" The Fourth
Circuit relied upon the State Department interpretation that the use
of the apartment building was within the meaning of the statutory
provision concerning property used in maintaining a diplomatic
mission." The court invoked international law to the extent that
it observed that the State Department position was consistent with
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. °0 The Convention
provides for immunity from actions of attachment or execution af-
92 See, e.g., United States v. City of Glen Cove, 322 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (mem.),
affd per curiam, 450 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1971); Fin. v. Town of Pelham, 26 A.D.2d 35, 270
N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966).
" United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d at 930. In fact, the President delegated
his authority to the Secretary of State by Executive Order 12101, 43 Fed. Reg. 54, 195
(1978). United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d at 930. The agreement was signed
by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, id., and the court ruled that the presumption
of official regularity was not rebutted even though the State Department's internal rules
require that Assistant Secretaries be responsible for such agreements. Id. at 930-31.
Id. at 932-35.
's Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. SS 1609-10 (1976).
, United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d at 928. The lien originally was imposed
in the predecessor case in the same court. See County Bd. v. E. Ger., No. 78-293-A (E.D.
Va. Sept. 7, 1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1402. 1403 (1978); County Bd. v. E. Ger., No. 78-293-A
(E.D. Va. Sept. 6, 1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1404, 1405, 1406 (1978).
" United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d at 932-33. See Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. S 1610(a)(4)(B), supra note 57.
" United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d at 933-34.
" Id. at 934-35. In other words, while the residence of the Chief of a diplomatic or con-
sular mission is exempted specifically by the statutory language, the court has construed
the general language of the exemption concerning use for diplomatic or consular purposes
to include housing for staff members.
" United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d at 933.
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fecting the premises of a mission. 01 The Fourth Circuit held hous-
ing for embassy staff exempt from taxation under the provisions
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 regarding im-
munity from execution." 2
The second argument presented by the County was that "the
commercial acquisition of the property indelibly stamps the use
of the property as a commercial activity."'0 3 This argument touched
on a continuing problem with the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity;' 4 that is, what constitutes commercial activity. The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 has defined commerical
activity as follows: "either a regular course of commercial conduct
or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act,
rather than by reference to its purpose."'0 5 The House Report ex-
plained the definition further: "if a commercial activity is customar-
ily carried on for profit, its commericial nature can readily be as-
sumed," and if a contract is "of the same character as a contract
which might be made by a private person," it may be construed
as commercial in nature.'
The primary distinction to be drawn is between the nature and
purpose of the activity. "[Tihe fact that goods or services to be
procured through a contract are to be used for a public purpose
is irrelevant; it is the essentially commercial nature of an activity
or transaction that is critical." ' 7 The House Report included an
example of a contract for repairs to an embassy building as the
kind of contract that should be considered commercial even though
the ultimate object was to further a public function.0 8 Most impor-
tantly, however, the Report expressed the legislative preference
that the courts should have "a great deal of latitide" in determin-
"' See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6604, 6619.
" United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d at 935.
Id. at 934.
'" See supra note 37 and the text to which it pertains. The restrictive theory exempts
the commercial acts of a sovereign from immunity. See Hearings on H.R. 3493 before Sub-
comm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1973) (testimony of Charles N. Brower, Legal Advisor, Department
of State).
105 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. S 1603(d) (1976).
1'6 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6604, 6615.
107 Id.
log Id.
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ing what is a commercial activity rather than that "an excessively
precise definition" should be included in the Act."0 9
Understandably, considerable litigation has ensued concerning
what is and what is not commercial activity by a sovereign." A
federal district court"' recently suggested two standards for a court
to follow in defining commercial activity: 1) that the activity be
defined narrowly based upon the specific facts of each case to avoid
areas "that touch very closely upon the sensitive nerves of foreign
countries," and 2) that standards recognized under international
law be used."' The Second Circuit has specified three sources of
authority that should be used in lieu of a precise statutory defini-
tion: 1) legislative history, 2) case law in existence at the time of
the passage of the act, and 3) "current standards of international
law concerning sovereign immunity.""'
The County in United States v. County of Arlington apparently
viewed the purchase of the property as the relevant commercial
act implementing the purpose of providing housing for the mis-
sion staff."' The Fourth Circuit, however, relied upon the House
Report clarification that "embassies and related buildings could
not be deemed to be property used for a 'commercial activity' as
required by section 1610(a)."" 5 Under this analysis, therefore, hous-
ing for embassy staff may not be taxed because of its immunity
from execution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976."'
The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the pre-arrangement situation,
while dependent upon a federal statute, fell within the immunity-
from-execution approach to taxation of diplomatic and consular
property."' In the first part of the decision, the County was pro-
109 Id.
"I See, e.g., Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Nig., 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981); Gemini
Shipping, Inc. v. Foreign Trade Org. for Chems. and Foodstuffs, 647 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1981);
Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers v. Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D.
Cal. 1979); Yessinin-Volpin v. Navosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
'" The United States District Court for the Central District of California. Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 477 F.
Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
"I Id. at 567.
113 Tex. Trading and Milling Corp. v. Nig., 647 F.2d at 309-10.
114 United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d at 934.
I Id. at 933. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 11976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6628.
,16 See United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d at 935. See also supra note 103
and the text to which it pertains.
"1 See supra notes 49-60 and the text to which they pertain.
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hibited from assessing taxes."' Thus, the Fourth Circuit cannot
be said to interpret immunity from execution narrowly. Indeed,
it also precluded voluntary payment of the taxes assessed but un-
collectable by compulsion of law."9 Sovereign immunity from tax-
ation has not been established as a separate principle of interna-
tional law. Instead, such immunity is dependent either upon a treaty
or international agreement or upon the immunity-from-execution
provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.' Thus,
the Fourth Circuit holding may signify a retreat from the reliance
upon customary international law in Argentina v. City of New York. 2'
As municipalities appear willing to continue their efforts to tax
foreign sovereigns,2 ' and as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 requires a case-by-case definition of commercial activity,'23
bilateral agreements concerning specific exemption from taxation
of consular property24 well may remain the best protection for
the interests of the United States and the foreign sovereigns with
missions within its territory.
Maija S. Blaubergs
18 United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d at 927.
"9 See supra notes 53, 54, 56 and the text to which they pertain.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. S 1610 (1976).
II Argen. v. City of N.Y., 25 N.Y.2d 252, 250 N.E.2d 698 (1969).
E.g., Arlington County continued to attempt to tax East Germany even after the United
States government had entered into an agreement with East Germany exempting it from
such taxation. United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d at 928. Local courts also
have been sympathetic to the efforts of municipalities to tax the property of foreign
sovereigns within their locality. One New York county court, reluctantly declining jurisdic-
tion, made the following observations: The State Department may not realize that "our
finest villages" may be ruined if "ambassadors from 50 or more nations should decide to
squat 'tax free' in the highest assessables (they take over nothing but the best)," raising
the taxes of the other inhabitants to such an extent that they could not afford the "honor"
of having them. In re City of New Rochelle v. Ghana, 44 Misc.2d 773, 775, 255 N.Y.S.2d
178, 180 (Westchester County Ct. 1964).
123 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6604, 6615.
114 Some cases have been concerned with possible differences between diplomatic and
consular property under the sovereign immunity doctrine because consular functions in-
clude commercially oriented acts. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 26, at 247-51. However,
the most recent case on point, Argen. v. City of N.Y., 25 N.Y.2d 252, 250 N.E.2d 698 (1969)
held consular property to be exempt from taxation under customary international law.
Id. at 265, 250 N.E.2d at 704. See also Foreign Legations case, supra note 55.
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